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Worker participation hardly existed in French enterprise before the 
victory of the Left in 1981. Enterprise committees ("comite*s d'entre- 
prise"), created after World War II, were concerned almost entirely 
with external activities (travel, holiday, cultural and educational pro 
grams). Trade unions competed vigorously for control of enterprise 
committees, whose sizable budgets offered opportunities for employ 
ment of union militants and shaping of working-class attitudes. But 
enterprise committees did not share meaningfully in management
It was the intention of the Left government in 1981 to transform 
authority relations within enterprises. The stated goal was eventually to 
achieve economic democracy, summed up in the slogan "autogestion" 
(literally, self-management). Roundly condemning both capitalism 
(Socialists agreed with Communists on the need to break with this evil 
system) and Russian-style communism (Communists agreed with 
Socialists that the Soviet Union represented a form of authoritarian 
socialism that had to be transcended), the united Left pledged to enable 
workers to become masters and shapers of their own destinies. 1
In the summer and fall of 1982 a series of four laws was enacted by 
the National Assembly creating "new rights for workers," known pop 
ularly thereafter by the name of the Socialist Minister of Labor, Jean 
Auroux. The lois Auroux, or Auroux laws, mandated the creation in all 
enterprises employing over 200 people of "groupes d'expression 
directe" (expression groups), in which workers would be able to speak 
up directly and collectively on any aspect of their workday life. Impor 
tant new powers were also devolved upon the enterprise committees, 
whose members are elected only by workers. Management was 
required to inform enterprise committees ahead of time concerning any 
important decisions—including production and pricing strategy, intro-
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duction of new technology, and investment policies. And enterprises 
were also required to bargain collectively with unions every year. What 
happened? Did the French Left find a "third way" between grasping 
capitalism and authoritarian socialism?
To judge by the accounts that have appeared so far outside of 
France, very little of consequence has happened,2 Foreign observers 
have tended to downgrade the changes introduced by the Auroux laws. 
W. Rand Smith demonstrates convincingly that the laws have not 
enabled workers to challenge the basic power of private (and, we may 
add, public) employers to make decisions. Hence, autogestion (defined 
as the exercise of control over workplace decisions), he says, has not 
been achieved. Indeed, employers have turned the Auroux laws to their 
advantage, so that worker control is farther away than ever. The laws 
are an attempt to "modernize" labor-management relations, Smith con 
cludes, "by giving workers an opportunity to express themselves and 
by encouraging collective bargaining."3 Hence, French practice has 
merely been brought into line with practice elsewhere.
Bernard Moss affirms also that the Auroux laws have failed to bring 
about a change in the balance of power. He sees continuity in labor- 
management relations as the major feature of the modern period in 
France, described as "the cycle of managerial supremacy interrupted 
by waves of radical protest which have characterized its industrial 
past"4 Similarly, Duncan Gallic concludes that the laws did little to 
modify the traditional structure of French industrial relations. 5 A slight 
difference of emphasis may be noted in the appraisals of these observ 
ers. "Modernized" managerial supremacy presumably is not the same 
as an immutable traditional structure.
Why didn't the French Left break with capitalism? The reasons 
mentioned by Smith and Moss include: the inherent ambiguity of the 
notion of autogestion, the rivalry between Socialists and Communists, 
divisions among the unions, and government-sponsored austerity mea 
sures. "Under these conditions," Moss observes, "it was not surprising 
that managerial adversaries rather than union supporters derived the 
greatest satisfaction from the application of the new laws."6 In addition 
to the unfavorable circumstances, Smith adds, the Socialist party was 
not able to adopt a program capable of translating its aspirations into 
reality. The implication is that under favorable conditions—unity of 
the Left parties and of the working class, a period of economic growth
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and prosperity, and a firm political will to break with capitalism—the 
goal of autogestion would be within reach. As the French would say, 
"Vouloir, c'est pouvoir" (where there is a will, there is a way).
These critics are thoroughly familiar with labor-management rela 
tions in France, and with the excellent studies by French labor sociolo 
gists on the implementation of the Auroux laws.7 Each point in their 
argument is well taken. But they have underestimated the importance 
of changes in the climate of labor-management relations and have 
drawn partial conclusions. The purpose of this essay is to call attention 
to new developments in industrial relations in France since the adop 
tion of the Auroux laws, and to show that the failure to achieve the 
stated goal of the French Left sheds precious light on the theory of eco 
nomic democracy.
Managerial Supremacy—But Why?
Agreement may be registered at the outset on one key point: the par 
ticipative structures created by the Auroux laws have come under the 
domination of management. To understand why, let us take a closer 
look at these structures. Between 1983 and 1985, when the Auroux 
laws were reviewed, amended, and reenacted by the National Assem 
bly, some 6,000 agreements were reached between management and 
the representatives of workers (either unions or enterprise committees), 
leading to the creation of about 100,000 expression groups. Typically, 
an expression group consists of 15 to 20 people who meet two or three 
times a year and have the right to "express" themselves on any aspect 
of their working conditions.
Some major trends were immediately evident. Better educated 
workers tended to speak up and monopolize the time of most groups; 
only skilled leadership was able to prevent this from happening. As 
predicted by the skeptics, apathy set in after the initial period of enthu 
siasm. Workers generally lost interest in attending meetings, even 
though they were on company time. Within two years, about one-third 
of the expression groups had ceased to meet altogether, and another 
one-third met only intermittently.
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Expression groups that meet regularly share a crucial characteristic: 
their worker-members are mobilized and actively supported by man 
agement. As one French sociologist put it, successful expression 
groups have been a creation of "the Prince."8 This development 
resulted from a turnaround of business policy on workforce participa 
tion. Immediately after the adoption of the Auroux laws, the Conseil 
National du Patronat Frances (CNPF)—which had fought their adop 
tion tooth and nail—encouraged its members to play the game accord 
ing to the changed rules in order to prevent the Communist-led 
Confederation Generate du Travail (CGT) from taking over. An 
Estates-General of the CNPF in 1983 urged managers to train foremen 
and supervisory employees (cadres) as discussion leaders and to throw 
their resources and energies into the struggle to control the new groups.
Managers were advised through the business press to take the fol 
lowing steps: set up training courses for cadres; reward cadres for tak 
ing the lead in groups; make sure that questions and criticism receive 
the attention of the hierarchy; rapidly resolve problems thus called to 
the attention of superiors; and communicate this information to the 
groups. When managers were reluctant to take these measures (either 
because they were unconvinced of the need, had too much difficulty 
with cadres who wished to preserve their traditional prerogatives, or 
were harassed by a strong union leadership), expression groups faded 
away or were easily contained.
It was virtually impossible for the CGT or Confederation Franc.aise 
Democratique du Travail (CFDT) to displace management in giving a 
firm lead to the groups. Most militants were formed in the school of 
class conflict, and were not ready for instant conversion into apostles 
of class cooperation. Nor did their training prepare them to be adept at 
two-way communication between rank-and-file at one end and man 
agement at the other. In rare cases where unions were able to mobilize 
and guide workers, management was able to contain unruly expression 
groups by ignoring them. After a while, discouraged workers simply 
gave up.
An unforeseen development after 1982 was the phenomenal expan 
sion, not of expression groups but rather of all things, quality circles. A 
handful of French businessmen, inspired by Japanese production meth 
ods during an Asian tour, had founded the Association Franc,aise des 
Cercles de Qualite (AFCERQ) a year before the passage of the Auroux
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laws. The attempt to introduce Japanese-style quality circles was a fail 
ure—considered by workers to be the latest of many business-spon 
sored schemes to intensify class exploitation. It was only after the 
passage of the Auroux laws that the quality circle movement took off. 
As of 1988, AFCERQ had presided over the creation of some 40,000 
quality circles, and the principle was extended by the Chirac govern 
ment to the civil service.
How did it happen? Managers were advised to consider the expres 
sion group as a useful technique for involving workers in their enter 
prise and identifying problems. In a second step, workers were to be 
encouraged to help resolve problems—through quality circles. 
AFCERQ consultants warned that quality circles would wither unless 
substantial resources, time, and energy were invested in them. Success 
ful quality circles, according to AFCERQ, would require: commitment 
from top management; organization of study groups for travel to the 
United States or Japan; weekend seminars for all managers and cadres 
in order to consider the recommendations of the consultants; discus 
sion by all employees of the new procedures; and, finally and only 
then, creation and constant care of the quality circles.
The pressure on workers to enter and participate in the quality 
movement was irresistible. The unions, including even the CGT, gave 
up their boycott. Alas (for management), quality circles are subject to 
the same trends of apathy that wreaked such havoc with expression 
groups. The most recent development is to make emphasis on quality 
part of the productive process through work teams, suggestion boxes, 
and collective participation in definition of goals for the enterprise, 
along with expression groups and quality circles.9
Equally disappointing to advocates of worker control has been the 
performance of enterprise committees. In the original conception, dele 
gates elected by workers are to give an opinion on all important deci 
sions by management before they are taken. Management is also 
required to submit annual reports to enterprise committees, which are 
permitted to hire specialists (such as accountants, lawyers, or engi 
neers)—at company expense—to help them understand these reports. 
Great hopes were placed in enterprise committees, suitably aided by 
outside experts, union headquarters, and political parties, to counter 
management proposals with their own. Enterprise committees were to 
constitute a rival power within the structure of enterprise, and perhaps
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prepare the way for the assumption of managerial prerogatives by 
workers. The Communist party planned to use enterprise committees 
to impose its celebrated "new criteria of management"— production 
for use rather than for profit—throughout the economy.
Enterprise committees suffered the same fate as expression groups, 
and for much the same reasons. Management could ignore recommen 
dations from hostile enterprise committees with relative ease. More 
positively, management made the agreeable discovery that it could 
communicate more effectively with workers through their elected dele 
gates, and with delegates through their hired experts. Instead of chal 
lenging capitalism, enterprise committees and expression groups for 
the most part were enrolled in a vast campaign to strengthen it—in 
order to protect jobs and raise salaries.
The fate of participative structures thus points up the inherent diffi 
culty of maintaining worker autonomy against the formidable pressure 
that can be brought to bear by the concentrated power of management. 
Only one effective counterforce can be envisaged: the unions. But 
worker autonomy has meant, in France, independence of workers from 
all external constraints, including that of unions, which are bureaucra- 
tized and linked to potentially domineering political parties and the 
State. Worker control is not the same as control by unions and parties 
in the name of workers. 10
The failure of enterprise committees to offer a feasible alternative to 
management policies is highly instructive. Almost immediately after 
the passage of the Auroux laws, the CFDT found that its resources 
were stretched too thin to be able to take on managerial functions as 
well, and it stopped submitting counterproposals. The CGT, on the 
other hand, drew up a number of counterproposals, particularly in 
industries threatened by layoffs or plant closings.
Invariably, the CGT counterproposal consisted of a detailed inven 
tory of customer needs, and of functions performed by each work post, 
all leading to the triumphant conclusion that the enterprise is viable 
and not a single job need be lost. What if there is no longer a market? 
That is because management is thinking in terms of short-term profit 
instead of social use. Plenty of customers are out there, in the Third 
World and in Eastern Europe. How those customers would be able to 
pay for goods without subsidies from French taxpayers is never 
explained. Part of the standard counterproposal was also elimination of
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bothersome imports, while foreigners presumably would be happy to 
go on buying French goods without any thought of retaliation. CGT 
proposals were considered unconnected to reality, not only by manage 
ment of private enterprises, but also (perhaps even more forcefully) by 
the Socialist State responsible for the nationalized industries. 11
Why has it been impossible to maintain worker autonomy against 
bureaucratic pressure? For Edmond Maire, perhaps the most important 
advocate of autogestion in the 1970s, the reasons go beyond the con 
tingent factors mentioned by Smith and Moss (unemployment, auster 
ity, lack of political will). It is the very notion of worker autonomy that 
he calls into question. For a long time, Maire concedes, the labor 
movement contrasted monarchical enterprise (where the boss wields 
absolute power) with models reflecting the belief that workers can 
decide everything. But now we must go further, declares the former 
general secretary of the CFDT, and recognize the specificity and legiti 
macy of the managerial function, which cannot be the result of collec 
tive deliberation. Autogestion, he concludes, remains a valid ideal, but 
is not a model for enterprise. The need today is not for a "break with 
capitalism" (termed by Maire "a dangerous illusion and nonoperative") 
but vigorous defense of workers' interests and "logic" within enter 
prises. In effect, virtually every plank of the CFDTs radical program 
of the 1970s has been discarded since the adoption of the Auroux 
laws. 12
"Capitalism Ain't What It Used to Be"
A new model of enterprise has emerged in France, and it has 
become dominant within the large, professionally managed sector of 
the economy (both public and private). Before 1981, it was taken for 
granted that management made all decisions, which were then trans 
mitted downward to employees. Negotiations with unions took place 
mainly at the branch or industry level (not within individual enter 
prises), following guidelines set by the State. In turn, business was 
expected to follow the lead of the State, whose top functionaries were 
presumed to have a sense of national interest. This patriarchal model 
reflected the prevailing belief within the French political class after the
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Liberation that French capitalism was backward, and that only a 
dynamic State, served by specially trained civil servants, could accom 
plish the task of rapid modernization.
"Le capitalisme n'est plus ce qu'il e*tait," exclaimed Edmond Maire, 
who can hardly be accused of special sympathy for the profit motive. 
Capitalism has undergone a "cultural revolution," observes Pierre 
Rosanvallon, not an admirer of capitalism in the past. And Henri 
Weber, former Trotskyist and now close collaborator of Laurent 
Fabius, speaks of a "mutation" of French capitalism.13 What they all 
refer to is the new model of the dynamic sector, based on a freer flow 
of information throughout enterprises oriented to the market rather 
than to the State. A significant portion of the budget of a modern 
French enterprise (about 5 percent of the total payroll) is now devoted 
to securing information from the base, circulating it through the hierar 
chy, and ensuring collaboration of employees, cadres, and managers in 
the achievement of agreed-upon goals. This emphasis on permanent 
dialogue, two-way communication, and service to customers rather 
than carrying out the commands of the State is a break with past prac 
tice.
However, management's very success in creating participative 
structures opens the way for a possible counterattack by unions and 
workers from within the citadel. The process of dialogue changes atti 
tudes and affects power relationships. In an enterprise fully committed 
to participation, managers must eventually recognize the legitimacy of 
a "workers' logic," to use Edmond Maire's term, and the importance of 
workers' contribution to production. Absolute monarchy is converted 
into at least a rechtstaat, or rule of law, with democracy perhaps in the 
offing. But industrial democracy in this sense means interaction 
between managers (who retain their prerogatives) and workers, not the 
absorption of elites into a self-governing community.
The new model enterprise poses a formidable problem for unions, 
which lost half of their members between 1976 and 1988. Pierre 
Rosanvallon estimates union membership as of 1988 as follows: 
600,000 for the CGT; 400,000 each for the CFDT and the Force- 
Ouvriere (FO); and 200,000 for the teachers' union. 14 The virtual col 
lapse of unions, says Rosanvallon, is due to their inability so far to 
cope with the cultural revolution that has taken place in enterprise. 
Unions traditionally represent workers in negotiations with business
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and the State, and also in social security and welfare councils. They 
have not been oriented towards participation in an "informational" 
enterprise in which workers, cadres, and managers are in direct com 
munication with each other and collectively regulate daily life. To meet 
this immense challenge, unions must recast their structures and create a 
new culture based on communication rather than either confrontation 
or meek submission. Only CFDT leaders have thought through the 
problem, but so far they have not been able to gain the support of their 
own militants in bringing about the necessary reforms.
Primacy of the Political
Political factors have been and remain crucial determinants of the 
nature of labor-management relations in France. Paradoxically, it was 
the victory of the Left that led to an expansion of managerial power. 
Before 1981 all attempts by business and parties of the Right to inte 
grate workers into enterprise were rejected by unions and the parties of 
the Left. But when the Left, in power, vowed to "break with capital 
ism," workers and unions were carried into new structures of participa 
tion on a wave of enthusiasm. Radicalization of the Socialist party was 
a deliberate tactic by Francois Mitterrand to outflank the Communist 
party on its Left, and to demonstrate to workers that they could have 
socialism of a democratic rather than an authoritarian variety. Autoges- 
tion was an integral part of a Socialist program designed to reduce the 
Communist party's appeal; it was a useful fiction. But, as it turned out, 
once workers entered into the structures created by the Auroux laws 
they could not resist domination by cadres and managers.
When the Socialists returned to power after the legislative elections 
of 1988, they did not revive the ideological battle cries of 1981. On the 
contrary, Prime Minister Michel Rocard fully accepted the principle of 
worker participation and free flow of information within enterprise. He 
embraced quality circles, instructed every ministry to draw up plans for 
improving quality, and called for constant dialogue between workers 
and managers as a top Socialist priority—thus trying to appropriate the 
quality movement for the Left. The Socialists are seeking ways to push 
the balance of power back in the direction of workers and unions—an
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extraordinarily difficult task. The experience of the Auroux laws so far 
demonstrates that management enjoys an inherent advantage in the 
contest for control of decisionmaking within enterprise.
To further complicate matters, the Socialist party did not have an 
absolute majority in the National Assembly. The Communist party 
made a slight comeback, gaining enough representation in the National 
Assembly to command respect The strategy of both the Communist 
party and the CGT was to take a militant line, resort to confrontational 
tactics, and compel the Socialists to turn toward the Left instead of 
opening to the Center. Class collaboration may prove to be as elusive 
as the Socialist commonwealth.
Were the Auroux laws, in the final analysis, a failure? I suggest that 
this attempt to create a worker democracy was actually an extraordi 
nary success, because it permitted Francois Mitterrand to attain his 
supreme goal: to reduce the influence of both the Communist party and 
the CGT. Many workers were now persuaded that the Socialist party 
indeed had their interests at heart. They responded by turning away 
from the Communists, enabling Socialists to dominate the Left; the 
way was thus cleared for genuine alternation in power between the 
Right and a now respectable Left. As a result, the climate of labor- 
management relations in France has changed significantly.
Worker democracy was always an unrealistic goal; but giving work 
ers a say in enterprise is a major progressive development. Only the 
victory of the Left in 1981 and the Auroux laws made it possible to 
break down working-class and trade union resistance to participation 
in enterprise. Management was able to dominate participatory struc 
tures easily enough in a first step. But French business is beginning to 
realize that there is a distinctive and valuable workers' logic (as 
Edmond Maire put it). For French enterprises to compete effectively, it 
is now currently accepted, they must convert to models in which infor 
mation flow is circular rather than merely from the top down. The bat 
tle between labor and management, and between Left and Right, is 
now being redefined within a transformed economy.
The social base of French politics is no longer what it was before the 
passage of the Auroux laws. The major actors within the system—busi 
ness and labor—have in the past decade undergone at least the begin 
ning of a mutation. Labor-management relations in France have not 
reverted to their pre-1981 status; nor have they become a copy of for-
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eign models. Traditions of Jacobinism, business paternalism, revolu 
tionary syndicalism, and mass communism have produced unique 
conditions for the ongoing experiment in workforce participation. 
Industrial relations surely will continue to evolve and to reflect a dis 
tinctively French political culture somewhere this side of Utopia.
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